T H E IMPACT O F DEREGULATION O N T H E EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES O F AIRLINE MECHANICS DAVID CARD"
This paper describes the effects of deregulation on negotiated wage rates and en~ployment levels of aircraft mechanics in the schedulecl airline industry between 1978 and 1984. A firm-by-firm analysis ofthe established trunk airlines shows relatively small changes in real wage rates since 1978, and only recent changes in interfirm wage differentials. Employment growth rates, however, have varied widely, both among the establishecl trunk airlines and between them and the new-entrant and former local service airlines. The data suggest that deregulation shifted 5,000 to 7,000 maintenance jobs from the established trunks to the smaller airlines. 'The shift may have reduced average hourly earnings of mechanics in the industry by as much as 5 percent below the level they would have reached in the absence of deregulation.
T H E recent experience of t h e airline publicized contract renegotiations, often industry provides a remarkable case involving wage concessions or two-tiered study for the analysis of wage and employwage schedules. ment outcomes under trade unions. Since This paper describes the impact of depassage of the Airline Deregulation Act in regulation on the wage rates and employ-1978, the relative output of the trunk' airment of airline mechanics at the trunk lines has steadily declined, while that of new airlines between 1978 and 1984.' T h e analentrants and former local service carriers ysis is prelin1inal-y since the full effect of has steadily increased. These changes have deregulation has not yet been felt, and been associated with substantial reductions mechanics' wages are establisl~ed in longin e~nployment at the trunks and widely term contracts that acljust slo~vly to external shocks. Nevertheless, the experience of airline ~necllanics in the first sAix vears of de-*The author is Assistant Professor of Economics at , Princeton University. H e thanks Richarcl Johnson for regulation yields a number of insights into supp1)ing some of the clata for this study, Robert the response of trade unions to an increase LaLoncle and Dan Sichel for assistance, a n d George in product market competition.
Jakubson fhr h e l p f~~l
Among the three major groups of skilled comments and suggestions. ' U e f~r e 1981 the Civil Aeronautics Board categor i~e d airlines into tr~unks, local-service airlines, and a variety of other designations (such as All-Cargo Car- %ere is a !rowing literature o n the effect of cleriers, Alaskan Carriers, ancl Halvaiian Carriers). Tlie regulation on ~ndustrial 1-elations in the airline inclustrunk airlines included the largest firms in the inclustry. See in particulal-the papers by 13e1id1-iks. Fe~lille, try, with authority to service major clomestic ancl interand S~e r s~e n (1980), Northrup (1983) , and Cappelli national routes. In 19'78 the trunks were .41nerican, (1985) . Cordes, Golclfarh, and ,Jolinson (1084) tlescrihe Braniff, Continental, Delta, National, Northwest, Pan the likely effect of ] o b loss co~npensation provisions American, Trans World, Unitecl, and Western. In this of the Airline Deregulation Act. Bailey, Graham, ancl papel-, 1 use the tern1 tru~iiisto refer to these airlines ICaplan (1985) give an overview of deregulation's effect plus USAir.
on the industry as a whole.
Inductrictl cind Labor-Keiciizo~~s Rriueur. \'ol. 39, No. 4 (July 1986) . 0 by (:ornell L711iversity 00 19-799918615904 $0 1.OO employees in the airline industry (pilots, flight attendants, and mechanics), airline mechanics are atypical. First, their training and skills are relatively easily transferred out of the airline industry. Second, the services of nlechanics a r e relatively easily replaced: many airlines purchase all o r part of their maintenance services fi-om outside contractors. T h i r d , employment conditions for many mechanics resenlble those of industrial workers: roughly one-half of airline mechanics work at lnaintenance depots on conventional work schedules. For these reasons, of the three categories of skilled employees, airline mechanics are nlost sinlilai-to unionized workers elsewhere in the economy. It is natural, therefore, to look to the experiences of the mechanics in attempting to draw general conclusions from the deregulatory experience of the airline industry.
Wages a n d Employment of Airline Mechanics
T h e data for this study consist of annual obsei-vations on ernploynlent, wages, and output at eleven of the largest airline firms in the United States: American, Braniff, Continental, Delta, Eastern, Northwest, PanAnl, Transworld, United, USAir, and Western. Mechanics at seven of these airlines are represented by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace iYorkers IIAXI). Mechanics at American and P a n A~n are represented by the Transport Workers Union ('TWU), n~echanics at M'estern are represented by the 'Teamsters (IB'T), and nlechanics at Delta are unor--ganized. T h e Machinists and Teamsters also represent mechanics at several snlaller airliries and contract maintenance firnls.' trunks incurred large operating losses." Some observers have interpreted t h e recent movement awav from a uniform industrj nage as a pernlanent structural change e n g e n d e r e d by deregulation. Others have argued that airline-specific u7ag-e concessions reflect the interaction of L> general economic conditions and a newly competitive product market structure, and that i m u r o v i n~ economic conditions will renew pressure for uniform wages among the carriers. At this stage, however, it is unclear whether wage dispersion will persist or the industry ill eventuallv return to a more unifornl nage stlucture.
Further evidence on the distribution of nage rates within tlie scheduled airline industrv is uresented in Table 2. This table   , , presents wage data for airline mechanics from RLS industry u7age surveys conducted in 1970. 1975. 1980. and 1984. Average wage rates in the industry are closely linked to the contract rates reported in ' Table 1 . T h e~e is a do$$ nwarcl shift in "For the economy as a ~vhole, tlie 1982 recession was deeper but shorter-li\ed than the 1973-74 recession. In the airline industry. sales as nieasut-ed by revt.nue passenger tniles were more o r less colistant bettveen 1973 and 197.5 and between 1980 and 1982 (comparetl the inclustry average lvage rate relative to the contractual rate a t United Airlines (often considered the inclustry leader in negotiations ~vith mechanics before deregulation) after 19'75. Wage dispersion u~ithin the industry also increased in the most recent survey, as slio~+.n by the doubling of the coefficient of variation of wage rates betuyeen 1980 and 1984. T h e 1984 wage distribution sho~+.s a sniall concentration of lvage rates some 20-40 percent below the industry mean u7age, I\-hereas the earlier distributions a r e unimodal a n d highly concentrated.
Tables 1 and 2 also present evidence on time-series variability of real and relative lvage rates of airline mechanics. Outside of the air transport industry, the aircraft and parts industry is a major elnployer of aircraft mechanics.' T h e lvage chronology for mechanics at Roeing suggests that lvage rates have been very similar in the tu.0 industries. Relative lvage rates between the aircraft assembly a n d scheduled airline industries did not change between 1978 and 1983. T h e same conclusion emerges from a coniparison of mechanics' lvage rates and 'According to 1980 Census data, 52 percent of aircraft ~rlechanics are eniployed in the ail-transportation i t i d~~s t r y , a r e of' \\.liich r o u g h l y two-thirds en1plo)ed in the certifietl airline itldustr). Some 20 percent of aircralt mechanics are employecl i r i the ail-craft and parts intlustry. ant1 21nothe1-20 percent in tlie niilitary. average wage rates of maintenance mechanics or production ~vorkers in Inanufactul-ing. Relati\,e to either rate, airline mechanics' wages have been mol-e or less constant since t h e 1969 round of contract negotiations. Relative to t h e C:onsumer Price I n d e x , airline mechanics' a\.el-age u7age rates have been approxiniately constant since 1973.
T h e sinlilarity among contract i)ro\~isions at the major ail-lines extends to most aspects of comp~ilsation, including pensions, ;.acations, and health plans. In addition, the major airlines that have not negotiated wage co~lcessio~ls since 1982 (American, Northwest. United, ancl LSAir) have all introducecl t~vo-tiered 1v;ig.e s c h e d~i l e s .~ Triotiered scheclules have also recently spread among the sillaller unionized c;trriers in the indus~~->-."
T h e pattern of the Tvage data in T'able 1 contrasts sharply ~vith the pattern of the finn-specific employment data in Table 3 ."' Although wages remained relativel!. constant across firms fro111 19iili to 1983, employment grolvth varied substantially. Bet~veen 1970 ancl 1978, f o r example, mechanics' employment fell about 10 percent at American, Continental, ancl TI-answorld, and about 2 0 ~e r c e n t at U~litecl. DUI ing the same pel iod, emplo) merit g~ ew or rcniaincd approximately constant at the other airlines. In snite of this lariation I ac I-oss t~r n i s in c m u l o~ nlcnt d e~n a n d , air-
line ~nccllarlics Tvere re~llarkably successful in niaintaining a honlogeneous wage sti-uc-"1-lie scheclule at Xmeric;ui Airlines, 1'01-r\,itiil~le, pro\,icles approsinlately 23 perceiit lo~ver disco~~ntecl eal.tiiligs fol-nr\\ 1ii1-es tl~il-ing tlieir first I h e a l -, tvith the fir.111 t h a~~ lot-it~culiibelit wot-ker, with aili~ilar qltalihcations. T\vo-tiel.ecI sclieclules were introelucetl it1 tllr Frbruar) 1983 contract at .\meric;i~i: in the ,Julc 1984 cotitract at Llnited; in tlie .Al~t.il 16185 contract at VSr\ir; nticl In the ,Julr 16185 contt'ict ,it Nortllwest.
" I'wo-tiel-ed Tvage scliecl~~les were intt-otlucctl in ,4111-il 1982 at I'irclmotit; it1 J u n e 1082 at Ozat-k: nticl 111Jutre 1983 ,it Krpul~lic.
"'The emplo) ~iietit data In T,il,le 3 re111-eselit fol11-tl1 qu'trtrr e~i i p l o v~~l e~i t emplo)-in 1970 a~icl )r;i~--e~icl ment In 1078 anel 1984 fot-all niaitltetiancc ;it1tl rel;itrcl ~vorkrt-s. A comparison of' there tlnt;~ \\-itti t t~o \ e in 'r;tble 2, tiienrut.ing the enil,loymrnt of tiicill,itiics and inspectol-s rrcol tletl in the ititlurtl.) \vagr sur\,e)s. 5~1g-gests t h a t sotiic 70-80 p e r c e n t of' niait1teti;itice etilp10)ees are tiiechati~cs o r ltispectors.
ture. Until the most recent j.em-s there is n o inclicatio~l that niecha~lics' unions :icljusted contractual !\.age rates in response to fi1-111-specific factors.
T h e implication of this I~omogeneous industry !\.age structure is that a firm-l~y-fil-111 analj sis of Tiage deternii~iation for airline niechanics is likely to be misleading. Several authors have rece~itlj. esti~iiated moclels in ~vhich unions cletel-mine \\.ages at the fir111 level su11ject to tlie constraint i~nposecl by the tirni's 1al)or cleniand functio~i.' ' Althol~gh such a ~lloclel may IIe useful in tlescribi~lg Tvage cle\.elop~iients in other inclustries, anel niay turn out to be useful i l l clescl-ibing clevelopnielits in the ail-line illelustry after 1983, it gives few insigllts into the homogeneous Tvage structure that prevailed in this incllist~.j. before 1983.
Tahle 3 s~immal-ires levels ancl grolcth rates of the eniployment of m?' ,~litenance I\-orkers (about 75 percent of \\.horn are ~nechanics or inspectors) at 11 ~n a j o r airlines and in the indust1.j as a tihole. In 1970, the trunk airlines accounteel for 93 percent of total inelustry e~n p l o j r n e l l t . Bet!\-een 1970 ancl 1978, maintenance employnlent at the t r~i n k s Cell 1)). about 12 percent. Duri~ig the salnc period, employ1nc11t at tlic local scr\,ice airlines i~icreasccl I)\; 70 pel-cent, causing the share of elnploj~n e n t at the trunks to fall to 87 percent in 1'378. This trclid ~)crsistccl after 1078, \\.it11 sonie increase in the I-elati1.e g1-olvtll rate of maintenance cmploj.nicnt at tllc nontrunk airlines. In 1984, the trunks' sllal-e of inclustrj eniployment \ias 80 percent.
T o place these eniploy~iient trends in pers~ective, T a l~l e 4 presents all ovcl-vie~v of flight activity in the indtistl-y. Because ind~istry out11tit grew d~i r i n g the past 15 years ~\.liile emplo!,rne~lt fell, measul-ed o u t p u t pel-maintenance emplo),ee has inci-eased ell-amatically. B c t~~e e n 1970 and 1978 productivity incrcasecl ~.apidl\ at 110th the larger t r u n k airlines (~vhel-e neweliiclel~od!ãircl-ait replaced first-generation ' S r c . tot-esaliiplc, I l e l -~o u~o (1981) .iticl l'cnia\cl ol-I'rnca\ el ( I 98-1). airlines-often to the trunks themselves.':' O n balance, however, the o u t p u t a n d employment data suggest that most of the decline in the trunks' share of maintenance employment in the industry since 1970 is attributable to the decline in their share of industry output. This l~!~pothesis is tested in the next section using data from fbur major trunk airlines: American, Eastern, Transworld, and United.
Changes in Producti\ity of klaintenance Elnployees
Between 1978 and 1984, the combined output oi the four largest trunk airlines (American, Eastern, '~r a n s~v o r l d , ant1 United) increased b!, 1.1 percent. During the same period, theii-co~nbined inaintenance einploynlent fell I 0 percent. Although some of this improved productivity represents a longer-term trend, it is interesting to ask \ i h e t h e~. deregulation contril~uted to the rate 01' gi-o~vtll oi maintenance productivity at the airlines. Several recent changes associated with deregulation Inay have led to an increase in trend prodt~ctivity growth after 1978. T h e s e include the shift to~varcl h u h -l~s e d routing ''l'eople's Expros, f o~ e u a~~~p l c . e~iiplov\ 11o11e of its o\v11 airli~ie 111cc 11,111ics. s!,stems, ~vllich per~nit n o r e centralizecl line service maintenance, a n d negotiated changes i l l ~v o r k rules a n d staffing 1-eq~lirelnents.
In orcler to investigate tlie rate of grolvth of maintenance productivity, I fit a \ ariety of employnient functio~ls for nlechanics at the four ~n a j o r t r~~n k s . '~ Tllese functions express current mai~ltenance enlplo!.lilent in ternis of ail-line-specific constants and trends, as ~vell as laqqed emplo!.nient and C . L c u r r e n t flight activ~t!-. T h e inclusion of lagged emplo!~ment captures the idea that employment adjusts slo\vl!-to output fluctuations. Flight acti\ it!. is niodelecl in two alternative rvays. In the first case. I represent airline o u t l~u t by del~artures. and control for the composition of aircraft and routes b! . including nleasures of seats per aircl-aft and flight length. In the second case, I control for ail-craft and route co111-position 11)-including a nieasure of ton-nliles per departure. Tlie latter specification pel.-n i t s maintenance emplo!-nient to depend 011 ar11itrar)-co~nbinations of o u t p u t as measurecl by ciepal-tul-es o r available tonmiles.
X prelinlinar!-i~ir.estigation re~ealecl no systenlatic wage effects on enlplo!.n~elit levels at the four airlines. 111 \ien. of tlle stabilit!. of real $\.age rates ol.er time, holvever, ancl in the absence of data on prices of substitutes for nlecllanics' services, it is not s~l r p r i s i n g that the estimated .ivage effects are small and imprecise. I therefore concentrate on the link between enlplo!.-nient and o u t p~l t , and changes in output per rvorker over tilne.
T h e estilllatecl enlploynlent clenla~lcl f~~n c t i o n s presentecl in Table 3 . T h e are employment f'unctions are fitted as a fourequation seenlingl! unrelated regression, ~vith equality restrictions on the coeflicients of lagged eniplo!.nlent and o u t p~~t . Test maintenance actilities, after controlling for p a r t i a l -a c l j u s t~l~e~l t t I ( ' T h i s restriction is therefore inlposecl o n the estimated emnlo\.ment functions in Table 5 .
I ,
-1' 11e fii-st t~v o col~llil~is of tlie table present employrile~lt functions with 110 a1lo.i~-ance for clia~lges in productivity growth after 1978. T h e overall fit of the elnployment function is similar for the t~v o specifications, and there is no strong basis for choosing between t h e m . Tlie estinlated coefficients suggest that a 10 percent increase i l l output brings about a 6-7 percent increase i l l employnlent rvithin the !-ear, and a propoi-tional change in employlllelit ~vitliin three veal-s.
T h e implied deco~ilpositions of employment changes between 1978 and 1984 are nresented in Table ( airlines attributable to secular pi-ocluctil.ity growth. T h e productivit!-cornpollent is relati~.el!-large at United Airlines, a n d is roughly similar between the two specifications for all the airlines except Translvoi-ld.
T h e productivity effect is partially offset 11y increases in the sire of aircraft and length of flight, or alterliativel!-b! . increases in tonllliles per depai-ture. Changes in employmelit attributable to changes in output are large a n d negative at Transworlcl a n d Unitetl, and relati\ely s~ilall at American ant1 Eastern.
Colunlns (3) and (4) of Tahle 5 present enlploynient functions that pel-lnit airlinespecific shifts in the rate of growtli of 1nai11-tenance uroclucti\.it\. after 1978. T h e trend shifts al-'e ilnprecisely nieasured, and the liypotllesis that they are jointly equal to rero log E,, = ( I , + /I,/ + A log l:',,-, + 0 log F,, + yx.,+ e,, \IIICI.C I:',,re1)rcselirs 11iaintcn;lnce c m l~l o ) ment at ail--line i i l l pel.iotl /, ii alitl h, ;ire ailli~ic-sl~ecihc colistaiits slid tl-clicls. I-,, rcpscscn[s tlcparrlisrs ,it ailline I in })el,iotl1. .i,,r rproelit\ .i colitsol for ail-craft .iiid I-outrs, .tntl t , is an cl-rol. tcr111. T h e li\potliesis ol a onc-toone r r n p l o v n i e~i~-o~~i~~~i t .Yot~: Krgrcssions i~icluclcd utirrstrictctl airline-sprcific coIistaIits, u~irestrictcd airli~lr-specific trends, and durnmv variables f i~r strikes at Transworld (1973) and United (1975 United ( , 1979 . Cocflicie~its oti laggrcl rmplo) mcnt, departures, and alailablc ton-miles are restricted to be equal across airli~ics. T h e sutii of the corfficirnts on laggcd cmplov~ncnt and departures is restt-icted to unity. T h e prohahilit) lalucs of the tcst fill-this restriction arc rrportrd in row 7.
is easily acce ted at conventio~lal signifidards." ,%part from the distinction bet~veerl cance 1evels.lPrhe estimi~tes differ somesecular and post-1978 pi-oductivity trends, .ivhat between t h e two specifications, the decompositions of enlployme~lt changes although they suggest that t h e largest associated with the specifications in colincrease in trend productivity gro.ivt11 umns (3) and (4) are very similar to those occurred at United. T h e point estimates of presented in Table (5. the change in productivity at United imply Finally, the last two colunlns of' Tahle 5 that maintenance employment was approxpresent employment f'~1nctions estimated imately 20 uercent lo.iver in 1984 than it rvould'have'been in the absence of. a sliif't '"111 a first-order autorcgressiw ~iiotlcl uith a cocfin trend, although the estimated cumula- (1)correspond to the estimated nod el in colutn11(1) of'rable 5, while the predicted changes in columti (2) correspotid to the estimated model in colu~nn (2) of Table 5. under the hypothesis of a uniform shift in trend productivity growth at all four airlines. ,%gain, the estimated trend shifts are imprecise and differ somewhat depending o n specification. Co~ltrolling f o r flight length and aircraft size, the estimated shift in productivit!-growth is .7 percent per year, implying a cumulative effect in 1984 of about 6 percent. C:ontrolling for to11-miles, the estimated shift is slightly larger, implying a cumulative effect of about 10 percent in 1984.These estimates suggest that maintenance ernplo!-ment at the four-largest trunks i11 1984 was 5-10 percent lower than would have been predicted on the basis of pre-1978 trends. Because of the short time period since deregulation, however, it is difficult to obtain a precise estimate of the trend change in 1978, and the data are statistically consistent with no change in productivity growth rates.
T h e estimates in Table 5 and the decompositions in Table 6 suggest two conclusions. First, if deregulation has caused an increase in productivity growth rates, the effect has been relatively small. Second, the major components of employment change for t h e f o u r largest t r u n k airlines a r e decli~lillg departure activit!-(for T r a n sworld and United) and secular productivity growth. These effects have been partially offset by increases in aircraft size and flight length, with relatively small net changes in employnlent at two of the trunks (American and Eastern).
O n the basis of these conclusions. it is possible to estimate the effect of deregulation o11 maintenance emplo!-ment at the trunks by calculati~lg their relative output losses since 1978. Between 1978 and 1984, the gro~vth rates of departures and tonmiles for the industry as a whole exceeded the respective rates at the trunks by 17 and 18 percent.'" Assuming a unitar!-elasticity between employment and output, as suggested by the estimates in Table 5 , employm e n t would have been 15-20 percent higher at the trunks in 1984 if they had retained their pre-deregulation share of industry output. If, in addition, deregulation increased the rate of growth of maintenance productivity as suggested by the poi~lt estimates i11 Combining these estimates with an estimate of the wage gap between the trunks and the smaller airlines yields an estimate of the effect of deregulation on the earnings of mechanics in the airline industry. Evidence fi-om industry wage sur-veys and union contracts at the sniallei-airlines suggests that the hourly wage gap between the trunks and other airlines was relatively small in 1984: perhaps no more than 25 percent. This gap is consistent with the difference between new-hire rates a n d established rates in two-tiered contracts recently irltroduced at many of the trunks, and with the magnitude of wage concessions recently negotiated at several of the trunks. It also represents the historical gap between mechanics' wage rates at the trunks and al.erage hourly earnirigs of nlaintenance mechanics in manufacturing industries. ,5ssuniing a maximum 25 percent hourly wage differential, employment losses at the trunks attributable to deregulation reduced total average annual earnings of maintenance ~vorkers in the industry by approximately 5 percent below the level that would have prevailed in t h e absence of deregulation.
Summary and Conclusions
Deregulation of the airline industry has had a strong impact on the level of flight activity and the profitability of the trunk airlines."' For airline mechanics at these airlines, however, the main effect of deregulation has been to reduce employment. Although contracts at several of the trunks cut wages at the end of 1983, mechanics' real and relative wage rates were remarkably stable in the first five years of deregulation, a pattern consistent with the '"For example, Delta Airlines suffered operating losses for the first time i11 its history in 1982. Braniff, Continental, Eastern, and Western, which all eat-ned operating profits from 1970 to 1978, sustained large opet-ating losses from 1980 to 1983. By cotnparison, USAir earned sigtiificantly higher operating profits after 1978 than before.
behavior of mechanics' Ivages before deregulation.
U
Reductions in maintenance employment at the trunks since 1978 can be attributed to several different factors, incl~tding secular productivity growth and changes in output. ,411 analysis of the employmento u t p u t relationship reveals snlall but imprecisely measured increases in the rate of growth of productivity following deregulation. ,411 analysis of output shares, on the other hand, reveals a 10 percentage point d r o p in the share of flight activity at the trunks since 1978. Tliis loss in o u t~u t share is equivalent to a 15-20 percent reduction in maintenance employment at the trunks, or a transfer of 5,000-7,000 maintenance jobs from the trunks to the smaller airlines. Because t h e wage s a p hetween the trunks and the other airllnes in the industry is small, the effect of this transfer on the average hourly earnings of mechanics in the industry is small-at most, 5 Dercent.
Deregulation may h a l e affected pilots' earnings more than the earnings of airline mechanics." C:oniuared to mechanics' I earnings, ho~vever, historical differentials among pilots' earnings at the trunks Ivere relative1~-large. Moreover, pilots have relatively fewer employmelit opportunities outside the airline industrv than mechanics. These differences raise an important hypothesis for further research: is the effect of product market deregulation on wages o r earnings related to the historical structure of wages in the affected industry or the gap between wage rates in that industry and wage rates for sirnilal-workers in other industries? T h e experience of the airline mechanics suggests that the impact of cleregulation is snlall when interfirrn a n d interindustry wage differentials are small. More detailed comparisons among pilots, flight attendants, and nlechanics could provide useful evidence on this hypothesis. "According to BLS industry wage sunevs admitiistered in 1975, 1980, and 1984 , average gross monthly earnings of captains and the cort-espondilig coefficie~lts of cat-iation of captains ' earnings \\.ere $4,314 a11d . I 5 in 1975; $6,877 and . I 9 i11 1080; and $8,154 and .29 ill 1984 . In l9G5 clollars, thesc average earnings lecels were $2,676 it1 1955, $2,786 in 1980, atid $2,62l it1 1984.
